As political elites in the Caspian countries see themselves as actors who determine the fate of their countries and not as mere objects of international power struggles or as managers of pipeline projects, this contribution examines how domestic elites assess different pipeline projects. Based on close to 1,500 TV reports from national TV stations, which are seen as the mouthpiece of the ruling elites, we analyze the arguments surrounding oil and gas pipeline debate and construction in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Introduction
Although the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea Basin are relatively small in global comparison, they are considered of major geopolitical importance by external powers, as they are not controlled by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or by the Russian Federation. Therefore, they offer the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and China the chance to diversify their energy supplies. This opportunity has resulted in a geopolitical struggle over control of Caspian oil and gas production and transportation.
Accordingly, most existing publications on the topic analyze the exports of crude oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea region and the construction of export pipelines from a purely geopolitical perspective; nearly all accounts focus exclusively on the actions of big international players and refer to Caspian country's foreign policy options and preferences only in passing. Although the geopolitical perspective provides important insights, it oversimplifies international relations in the region and neglects Caspian countries as actors in their own right.
When Azerbaijan developed a more critical stance towards Western projects in the debate on the Nabucco pipeline and at the same time supported Georgia against Russian pressure, the deficit in the literature became obvious. This foreign policy move could not be explained by the increased influence of any one major outside power.
* This article has been written within the framework of the international research project 'Internal discourses and foreign policy-making in the Caspian region: Export pipelines, geopolitics and cultural orientation in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan' which is being conducted by the Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, Germany, since 2011. The project has received financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation, which is not related to the carmaker of the same name.
Consequently, some researchers have started to examine Azerbaijan's foreign policy in its own right. Kjaernet comes to the conclusion that 'Azerbaijan has exploited its new situation to position itself as an increasingly powerful and independent actor in the South Caucasus. Due to its energy independence, Azerbaijan has been able to do this without suffering any reprisal from the Russian side' (Kjaernet, 2010: 158) . Similarly, Ismayilov (2010: 4) argues: 'In an open effort to further diversify its linkages with the outside world and the ensuing dependencies and interdependencies that come from them, Baku is now keen to have its gas distributed among as many players in the region as possible, rather than limiting its exports to a single (western) market' (For a similar, but less pronounced assessment see Ipek, 2009 ). Franke et al. argue that in its policy towards the EU, Azerbaijan e confident of its potential for the export of energy resources e 'sees the EU on the receiving end of bilateral relations' (Franke, Gawrich, Melnykovska, & Schweickert, 2010: 149) . Similar studies on foreign policy orientation have been conducted for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (cf. e.g., Ipek, 2007; Anceschi, 2008; Hor ak, 2012; Kubicek, 2013 . An older work on the countries under study is Kuzio, 2000) .
In a similar vein, we argue that political elites in these countries clearly perceive themselves as actors who determine the fate of their countries and not merely as objects in an international power struggle. These elites discuss their export options not only in terms of economic gains but also see their decisions on export pipelines as the bases for strategic alliances with broader implications. Thus, an analysis of their reasoning relating to specific pipeline projects will help to provide a better understanding of their perceptions.
This article continues with a brief description of the methodological approach. Then, a short overview of the pipeline options available for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and their public assessment by the ruling elites of these countries is given. In the final part of the article, we present data on pipeline-related arguments and their connection to actual pipeline projects in order to draw some broader conclusions.
Methodological approach
The research project, on which this contribution is based, examines pipeline-related debates in three Caspian oil and gas states. It analyses mass media reporting on the issue, including TV, mainstream print media, business presses and news websites. The project also looks at selected decision-making processes through process tracing. In addition, interviews with relevant decisionmakers and journalists have been conducted.
The objective of the analysis presented here is to study the arguments for and against specific pipeline projects or export directions as they have been voiced by the ruling elites of the three countries under study, i.e., Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and to put these arguments into a broader context. The period covered in the analysis commences from 1998, when the first new pipeline project started to gain momentum, until 2013, when decisions had finally been made on all major pipeline projects.
The ruling elite can be defined as a complex aggregation of powerful political, economic, and social actors, the inner leadership of which is located in a country's government and legislature (Higley & Pakulski, 2011: 951) . Elite members 'are distinguished by their proximity to political decision-making and ability to influence political outcomes regularly and substantially' (Higley, 2011: 829) . Notably, the composition of the ruling elites in the three countries under study has not changed substantially during the period under study (cf. e.g., Denison, 2012; Guliyev, 2012; Umbetalieva & Satpayev, 2012) .
This analysis focuses on public statements of the ruling elites for two reasons. First, the (honest) private opinion of elite members is rarely accessible to researchers. Second, in order to understand political decision-making processes, it is important to understand the official positions of relevant actors, as these positions are used to legitimize policies and, thus, shape the policy output. We, therefore, think that in order to understand the rationales behind foreign policy concerning export pipelines in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, it is important to study how the relevant decision-makers publicly justify their decisions.
In order to establish the official view of the ruling elites, this study focuses on TV reporting for a number of reasons. First, as the issue of export pipelines is of major importance for all three countries, TV reports offer continuous coverage, whereas official statements are only released at the rarer moments when important decisions are being made, e.g., when a pipeline contract is being signed. Second, as TV is the by far most important source of news for the population in all three countries, political leadership has established rather tight control. As a result, TV presents only views accepted by the ruling elites, while e at least in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan e some print and internet media side with the political opposition and present views that are highly critical of the ruling elites (cf. e.g., Thomas, 2005; Freedman, Shafer, & Antonova, 2010; Anceschi, 2011; Junisbai, 2011; Kazimova, 2011; Freedman & Shafer, 2014) .
The role of TV as the mouthpiece of the ruling elites is confirmed by our analysis. Out of a total of 954 quotes in TV reports on export pipelines in the three countries under study, not a single one is from an opposition politician, while 65% of all pipeline-related quotes on Turkmenistan's TV are from the country's president himself. In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the share of presidential quotes is slightly over 25%. The total share of ruling elites in pipeline-related TV quotes amounts to some 75% in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and 85% in Turkmenistan. The remaining quotes are mainly from foreign politicians on the occasion of official visits.
The analysis of TV reporting on export pipelines is based on transcripts in an English translation provided by the BBC Summaries of World Broadcasts database, as no other source with such a broad coverage is available. Still, as the BBC does not offer full coverage of TV reporting, the text corpus does probably not contain all reports. However, with a total of 1,479 pipeline-related reports, the corpus provides a good impression of overall reporting patterns. The TV stations included are Turkmenistan's state TV Channel 1, Kazakhstan's Channel 1, Khabar TV and KTK and from Azerbaijan AzTV (Channel 1), ITV (Public TV), ANS, ATV and Lider TV.
1
Relevant texts were selected with the help of a search function. The search term used was 'pipeline'. All articles with any meaningful reference to an oil or gas export pipeline from the respective country have been included in the text corpus. The reference to export pipelines did not necessarily need to be in the headline; it may only constitute one paragraph of the article. If the reference was very marginal and did not relate to the issue of export pipelines, the respective article was not included.
Codings used in this analysis are 'pipelines mentioned' together with 'assessment of pipeline' (positive, neutral or negative), direct and indirect quotes and 'frames' describing major sets of arguments for or against specific pipeline projects, such as, e.g., geopolitics or profitability. For all 'frames' mentioned in TV reports, it was established with a separate sub-code whether the related arguments were seen as having explanatory power. Frames that were challenged in the specific TV report as lacking explanatory power, i.e., as not being relevant for pipeline decisions, were not included in this analysis.
2
As the project was designed to move beyond mere manifest content and to analyze arguments and assessments, it is based on 'interpretative coding'. Thus, it 'puts precedence with the coders judgments and believes that the elements in the content are symbols that require viewers to access their pre-existing mental scheme in order to judge the meaning in the content' (Potter & LevineDonnerstein, 1999: 259) .
The validity of the coding process was checked through parallel coding of a text sample by all coders. Training of the coders was continued until coherence was achieved. Throughout the coding process, disputable cases were discussed by the team, and respective decisions were included in the codebook, which include sub-codes and descriptions of the single codes.
3 All fully coded TV reports were finally checked by one and the same senior project researcher.
Export pipelines: an overview 4
Most of the oil and gas fields of the Caspian Sea Basin belong to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. After the end of the Soviet Union, these newly independent countries depended entirely on the Soviet pipeline network to export their energy production.
As Russia has a central position in the Soviet pipeline network, it remains a major player in the region. It sees the Caspian countries' dependence on the old Soviet pipeline system as a major foreign policy tool to maintain its influence in the so-called 'near abroad'. Accordingly, Russia succeeded in convincing Kazakhstan to build its first postSoviet oil export pipeline through Russian territory.
However, after years of negotiations and intensive lobbying by the US government, Azerbaijan built its first post-Soviet oil export pipeline through Georgia to Turkey, avoiding further exports through Russia. Additionally, the EU started a broad lobbying effort for a pipeline transporting Caspian gas through Turkey to Central Europe. These pipeline projects offered Turkey the opportunity to become a major energy hub between the East and the West.
The easiest oil export route from the Caspian Sea, though, would have been the use of the Iranian pipeline network with its established port facilities on the Persian Gulf coast. However, Iran was sidelined for political reasons, as US sanctions prevented the involvement of the Western energy companies that are active in the Caspian oil and gas consortia. Additionally, Iran's uncooperative behaviour on the legal status of the Caspian Sea hampered the exploration of resources as well as plans for a trans-Caspian export pipeline from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to the West.
China, on the other hand, which became the world's most dynamic importer of energy resources at the end of the 1990s, has increasingly gained access to the Caspian region. It has invested heavily in the Kazakh oil and gas industry and was also the first of the major powers to get involved in gas production in Turkmenistan. As a result, an oil pipeline and a gas pipeline from Kazakhstan as well as a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan provide China with considerable energy supplies. In the case of Turkmenistan, China has thereby ended the Russian monopoly on gas exports from that country.
In order to understand pipeline-related decisions, it is important to distinguish between oil and gas exports. The major difference relevant for export pipelines from the Caspian region is that oil can be transported by ship much easier than gas. Accordingly, for oil exports from a landlocked region like the Caspian Sea area, one pipeline to a port with an export terminal is sufficient. Such export terminals are available on the Russian and Georgian Black Sea coast, on the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean Sea and on the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the transport of oil from the Eastern coast of the Caspian Sea by ship to export pipelines on the West coast is feasible.
By contrast, for natural gas, transport by ship requires liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals, which have very limited capacities in the Caspian region and add considerably to transportation costs. Thus, the only feasible option for the transport of gas across the Caspian Sea, in terms of costs, is a pipeline.
As a large number of specific pipelines have been proposed in the more than 15 years since the Caspian oil and gas boom created the need for export opportunities, and as many of these proposals have been rather short lived, we have e in a first step e grouped the different pipeline proposals along specific export routes in line with geographical directions. In summary, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have potential export options to all four geographical directions: (1) northward through the Soviet pipeline network to Russia (and from there to export markets) or through newly built pipelines, (2) eastward to China, (3) southward either to Iran or through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India and, finally, (4) westward through a trans-Caspian pipeline to be constructed (or via ship transport) to the South Caucasus and from there to the EU and world markets. Azerbaijan also has the northern and the western option, but due to its geographical position on the West coast of the Caspian Sea, the southward option is limited to Iran and the eastward option to China is not feasible.
Favoured pipeline projects
In the case of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the boom started in the late 1990s with oil production, and the first export pipeline required was that for oil. Turkmenistan's oil production is too small to justify an export pipeline.
In Azerbaijan, the Western export route through Georgia and Turkey clearly dominated TV reporting. It is mentioned in 85% of all reports on export pipelines. At the same time only 3% of all reports contain critical assessments of the pipeline. Second follows the Northern option through Russia which is mentioned in only 7% of all pipeline-related TV reports, with 10% of these reports containing criticism of the pipeline.
In Azerbaijan, the overall amount of TV reporting on oil export pipelines differs over the years, depending on whether there is current news about a pipeline project, but the share of reporting on the different export routes remains rather stable. The Western route clearly dominates in every year from 1998 until 2013, and the Northern route is always mentioned in a small number of reports between 1999 and 2009.
Overall reporting on oil export pipelines decreases from over one hundred reports per year in 2005/06 to a mere handful of reports after 2009. This is a clear indication that the issue of oil export pipelines was settled for Azerbaijan with the construction of the BakueTbilisieCeyhan pipeline, which runs from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean Sea port and started operation in 2006.
Kazakhstan's TV stations, contrary to those in Azerbaijan, covered different export routes rather equally. The Northern option of exports through Russia, the Eastern option of exports to China and the Western option of exports through Azerbaijan's export pipeline were covered with a share of approximately 30% each, while the Southern option of exports via Iran was mentioned in only 10% of the TV reports about export pipelines. Interestingly, there is hardly any criticism of pipeline options at all in TV reports in Kazakhstan. Only the Western route receives some critical assessments, which can be found in 8% of the respective reports.
In the case of Kazakhstan, there are substantial changes over time in the share of different export routes in TV reporting. This reporting pattern is roughly in line with actual pipeline projects. The first oil export pipeline to be built was the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which runs from Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port Novorossiysk and started operation in 2001. The construction of the oil export pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey offered Kazakhstan the chance to supply oil exports to the port of Baku. When this pipeline started operation and in 2008 when Kazakhstan started to ship oil across the Caspian Sea for export through the pipeline, the Western route dominated pipeline-related TV reports in Kazakhstan. The section of Kazakhstan's oil export pipeline to China was completed in 2005, with a corresponding peak in media reporting in 2004/05. Since 2009, the TV coverage of oil export pipelines has been very low, indicating that the issue has lost relevance.
While Kazakhstan mainly focuses on oil exports, Turkmenistan e as one of the largest gas producers of the world e is exclusively interested in gas exports. In Azerbaijan, gas exports became an issue after a large gas field was discovered, which started production in 2006.
After TV reporting on gas export pipelines started in Azerbaijan in 2001/02, it has concentrated on the Western route even more than in the case of oil. The Northern and Southern options were both mentioned in just 1% of all pipeline-related TV reports. The major reason seems to be that the Azerbaijani government swiftly opted to build the gas export pipeline parallel to the major oil export pipeline through Georgia to Turkey. Tellingly, not a single criticism is mentioned in a total of 101 TV reports dealing with this pipeline. In the following years, the only question remaining was which of several competing pipeline projects would be selected for further gas exports to the EU market. Judging by TV reporting, the Nabucco pipeline was the clear favourite for Azerbaijan until 2009. It was mentioned far more often than rival projects. The first criticism was aired in 2009, but positive assessments still outnumbered critiques four-fold in that year.
Thus, the argument by Ismayilov and others, that 'Baku is now keen to have its gas distributed among as many players in the region as possible, rather than limiting its exports to a single (western) market' (Ismayilov, 2010: 4: see also Ipek, 2009) , is not supported by our analysis. Instead, Azerbaijan has, since the early 2000s, been completely focused on the Western route.
On Kazakhstan's TV stations, gas export pipelines are mentioned in less than a fifth of all pipeline-related reports, as oil dominates pipeline discussions. With its own gas production being too small for the construction of a major export pipeline, Kazakhstan has tried to join gas pipeline projects of neighbouring countries. When the discussion of gas export pipelines started in 2005, this again resulted in the consideration of different export directions. The Eastern direction, which was agreed in 2007 to be part of the pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, received the most attention in TV reporting, and not a single criticism was aired. The other three directions taken together had about the same share in reporting, with the Northern route being the second most often mentioned.
While pipeline-related TV reporting in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan devotes the most coverage to those pipelines that have actually been built, in the case of Turkmenistan, the Southern route, namely the pipeline through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, received the most attention; it is mentioned in more than half of all pipelinerelated TV reports. The export route through Russia, which was already in place at the end of the Soviet Union, is mentioned only in 20% of the reports. The newly built pipeline to China, which was commissioned in 2010, has been covered in TV reporting since 2006. In the following three years, it is mentioned more often in TV reporting than the Southern route. The Western route, namely a TransCaspian pipeline for exports to European markets, was by far the most prominent option in the late 1990s. However, since 2001, it has received very limited coverage on Turkmenistan's state-controlled TV.
Most major pipeline options are not criticized at all on Turkmenistan TV. In a total of 400 pipeline-related TV reports, there are only 10 examples of negative assessments of specific pipeline options. Thus, the degree of positive TV coverage compared to neutral TV assessments seems to be a primary indicator of the priorities of Turkmenistan's ruling elites. Only for the pipeline project through Afghanistan and Pakistan and for the pipeline to China do positive assessments clearly outnumber neutral descriptions. In the case of the Soviet-era pipeline through Russia, there are only 2 positive remarks, 5 points of criticism and 55 neutral references. The Nabucco project is only once mentioned positively.
In the case of Turkmenistan, TV reporting clearly reflects the preferences of the political leadership more than actual developments. Considering political as well as geographic conditions, a pipeline through Afghanistan and Pakistan would be more than challenging. At the same time, the Western route, actively promoted by the EU and Western energy companies in the context of the Nabucco project, has received hardly any attention in Turkmenistan and is the only major pipeline option being criticized. One might argue that watching Turkmen TV would have been enough to understand that linking Turkmenistan to the Nabucco pipeline was never feasible. It is also telling that the export pipeline through Russia does not receive positive coverage.
In summary, the ruling elite of Turkmenistan dreams about the southern route, does not like the Northern route, does not take the Western route seriously and pragmatically opts for the Eastern route. In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, however, TV coverage is largely in line with the progress of actual pipeline construction. In order to get a better understanding of the public justification for these decisions, we have analyzed the major arguments used.
Major arguments
A considerable number of the pipeline-related TV reports do not mention any arguments for or against specific pipelines or pipeline routes. One reason is that some reports (or the parts of reports related to export pipelines) are very short. Another reason is that some reports adopt a 'factual' or 'neutral' attitude by simply listing technical details of pipelines. As a result, in all three countries, the most common argument is present in less than 20% of all pipeline-related TV reports. However, a total of 922 arguments identified in the coding process allow for some conclusions.
The most common arguments in relation to export pipelines refer to geopolitical considerations. In all three countries, geopolitical arguments can be found in approximately 15% of all pipeline-related TV reports. However, the business argument, i.e. the profitability of the pipeline projects, is mentioned only slightly less in the three countries under study. If we take a broader view on foreign policy-related arguments, instead of a more narrow focus on geopolitics, the picture changes. In Azerbaijan, many arguments, named in more than 10% of all reports, relate to regional politics instead of geopolitics; they argue for or against specific pipeline projects with reference to relations with Armenia, Georgia or Turkey. In Turkmenistan, political relations with neighbouring states, namely Iran and also Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are mentioned as relevant arguments in over 15% of all pipeline-related TV reports.
Another important argument, next to foreign policy and profitability, is export diversification as an end in itself, i.e. the argument that one pipeline should be built to prevent the exporting country from becoming too dependent on another pipeline. Most often, this argument refers not to specific pipeline projects but to overall export directions, usually implying that an alternative to exports through Russia is needed. In Kazakhstan, export diversification is mentioned as an argument in 8% of all pipeline-related TV reports. Export diversification also receives attention in more than 10% of the reports in Turkmenistan. In the case of Turkmenistan, technical feasibility is also an important issue, which is mentioned in 11% of all reports.
Interestingly, environmental concerns are not an issue in pipeline-related TV reports in any of the three countries, and they are mentioned in no more than 3% of reports in Azerbaijan and hardly ever in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Overall, the diversity of arguments being used implies a pragmatic approach by the ruling elites. What determines support for specific pipelines is not geopolitics or profitability alone. Instead, it is a mix of several arguments, with foreign policy, profitability, export diversification and technical feasibility featuring most prominently. The fact that preferences for specific pipelines are based on pragmatic considerations is also demonstrated by the distribution of arguments among pipeline projects.
One interesting aspect in this context is how the weak points of specific pipeline projects are presented. In Azerbaijan, the only argument made in relation to export options involving LNG is technical feasibility. As a result, this option is presented as not desirable due to the challenges of LNG transport. In Turkmenistan, technical feasibility is mentioned as an argument in relation to the favoured pipeline project through Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, it is far outnumbered by arguments related to foreign policy, profitability and diversification. As a result, the pipeline is presented as challenging but highly desirable.
Moreover, in Turkmenistan, questions of technical feasibility are about as often discussed for the other two major operating pipelines, the one to Russia and the one to China. Interestingly, geopolitical arguments are very prominent for all pipelines except those running to Russia. Out of a total of 67 geopolitical arguments, only 6 refer to Russia. For the Russian option, technical feasibility and export diversification are the most common arguments on Turkmenistan TV.
In general, favoured pipeline projects score high in central arguments. In TV reports on the two major oil export pipelines built by Kazakhstan, arguments related to geopolitics, profitability or export diversification have a share of about a third each, while no other argument is mentioned more than twice. 5 The pattern for the oil tanker link across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan's export pipeline is similar, with the only difference being that relations with neighbouring states (i.e., in this case the transit countries) and the issue of political feasibility get some attention. In the case of Azerbaijan's major oil export pipeline, the frequency of the major arguments is twice as high as the national average. Foreign policy-related arguments have a share of 48% (with geopolitics accounting for exactly half of it), while profitability has a share of 18% and socioeconomic development has 10%. 6 Here, the logic seems to be that foreign policy trumps profitability, as the chosen pipeline was a very expensive project. In order to counterbalance the criticism related to profitability, arguments related to socio-economic development are introduced, which highlight the benefits of oil exports without having to address the costs of specific pipeline options. 7 Although socio-economic benefits obviously result from all export pipelines, on Azerbaijan TV this argument is e with just one single exception e only presented in relation to pipelines which have actually been built. Interestingly, the oil export pipeline through Russia, which is a minor export pipeline throughout the period covered here, has mainly been linked to profitability and has also received some praise for socio-economic development. Export diversification and foreign policy are both mentioned only half as often as profitability. Technical feasibility, for example, the threat of terrorism in the North Caucasus, is only seldom mentioned. 8 Contrary to the major oil pipeline, the reasoning here would imply that the pipeline through Russia is used because of its profitability, which trumps all the other arguments.
Conclusion
A closer look at the positions of the ruling elites of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as aired on TV, can help to understand these countries priorities concerning export pipelines.
Our analysis clearly identifies the preferred pipeline options of the ruling elites of the three countries. For both oil and gas, Azerbaijan has rejected the Russian option and prefers the Western direction, focusing on Turkey as an energy hub more than on direct negotiations with the EU. Kazakhstan has opted for diversification of its oil exports, hedging its export bets between Russia and China, while still not explicitly abandoning the option of oil transit through the South Caucasus. The latter option will become relevant if Kazakhstan manages to realize the long expected rise in oil production. Turkmenistan has tried to move away from gas exports through Russia with the help of export pipelines to China and to India.
This implies that contrary to the established view in the literature, over the last decade, Azerbaijan has never developed a serious interest in alternatives to the Western route, while Turkmenistan does not consider the Western route to be a relevant option.
In summary, all pipeline options promoted by the ruling elites have been realised e with the exception of the TurkmenistaneAfghanistanePakistaneIndia pipeline. Moreover, the preferred pipeline options are not simply a reflection of geopolitical pressures. Instead, decisionmakers in these three Caspian states consider a broad range of arguments. Chief among these considerations are geopolitical concerns and an interest in profit maximization. Additionally, relations with neighbouring states and export diversification play important roles as arguments related to specific pipeline projects. The prominence of diversification strategies highlights that the three countries are not just objects in geopolitical power struggles of more influential states.
It is also important to note that ruling elites of the three Caspian states focus on state-related aspects, such as foreign policy and state finances, but do not take a broader societal perspective in their pipeline decisions. The socio-economic development that could be achieved through oil and gas exports is only instrumentally used as an argument in order to promote the chosen pipeline option, but is clearly not treated as an end in itself. Environmental concerns, which sometimes dominate pipeline debates in Western countries, like in the case of the North American Keystone XL pipeline, are completely ignored.
